Is There a "Race-to-the-Bottom" in the Setting of Welfare Benefit Levels? Evidence from a Policy Intervention by Karin Edmark & Matz Dahlberg
Is There a "Race-to-the-Bottom" in the Setting of
Welfare Beneﬁt Levels? Evidence from a Policy
Intervention∗
Matz Dahlberg† and Karin Edmark‡
First version: November, 2003
This version: March, 2004
Abstract
In this paper we investigate whether local governments react on the welfare
beneﬁt levels in neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own beneﬁtl e v e l s .
We solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game by utilizing a
policy intervention; more speciﬁcally, we use a centrally geared exogenous place-
ment of a highly welfare prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities
as an instrument. The IV estimates indicate that there exists a "race-to-the-
bottom" and that the eﬀect is economically as well as statistically signiﬁcant; if
the neighboring municipalities decrease their welfare beneﬁt level with 100 SEK,
a municipality decreases its beneﬁt level with approximately 65 SEK. This result
seems to be robust to several alternative model speciﬁcations.
Keywords: Welfare beneﬁt level, Strategic interactions, Race-to-the-bottom,
Policy intervention
JEL classiﬁcations: C33, D6, H73
∗We thank Per-Anders Edin, Peter Fredriksson, Ann-Soﬁe Kolm, Olof Åslund, and seminar par-
ticipants at Uppsala University for helpful comments and discussions.
†Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. E-
mail: matz.dahlberg@nek.uu.se
‡Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. E-
mail: karin.edmark@nek.uu.se
11 Introduction
A "race-to-the-bottom" in the setting of welfare beneﬁt levels can materialize in two
diﬀerent ways. First, it may materialize in the presence of welfare migration; welfare
migration may make jurisdictions reluctant to oﬀer generous beneﬁts because it may
increase the number of program participants and thus the total cost of providing a
given level of beneﬁts. As a result, welfare beneﬁts may be lower than the socially
desirable level and, hence, we have a "race-to-the-bottom".1 Second, it may mate-
rialize if there are strategic interactions among the local jurisdictions, no matter if
there really exists any welfare migration or not; all that is required is a perception on
the part of local government decision makers that generous beneﬁts attract welfare
migrants, and, since nobody wants to be the most generous jurisdiction in the region,
we once again have a "race-to-the-bottom".
The evidence on welfare migration is mixed. While there are studies that have
found large eﬀects (see, e.g., Gramlich (1984) and Enchautegui (1997)), there also
exist studies that have found no eﬀects (see, e.g., Walker (1994) and Levine and
Zimmerman (1995)).2 The perhaps most reliable study, Meyer (2000), indicates that
there is a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect although it seems to be economically small.
It can be worth stressing, however, that welfare migration is only a prerequisite for a
"race-to-the-bottom" to materialize along the ﬁrst line of reasoning above. For a real
"race-to-the-bottom", the local politicians must also react on the welfare migration
by lowering their welfare beneﬁt levels.3
A more direct test of the existence of a "race-to-the-bottom" in the setting of
welfare beneﬁt levels is to test for strategic interactions among local governments.




ωijBj + Xiβ + εi (1)
where Bi is the beneﬁt level in local government i, Bj is the beneﬁt levels in other
local governments j, j 6= i, ωij are weights that indicate the importance attached by
local government i to beneﬁts in the other local governments, Xi is a vector of socio-
economic and demographic characteristics for local government i with the associated
parameter vector β,a n dεi is the error term. The parameter of interest, γ,r e p r e s e n t s
1Even though it is likely to overstate the issue, we will follow the earlier literature and use the
phrase "race-to-the-bottom" as a convenient shorthand description of the phenomenon of interest
(while the theory only points to a downward bias in welfare beneﬁts caused by a concern about
welfare migration, popular usage of the phrase sometimes have the meaning of a much more dire
outcome).
2Excellent surveys of the earlier research can be found in Bruckner (2000) and Meyer (2000).
3This latter step has typically not been examined in the earlier literature. In a companion paper
(Dahlberg and Edmark, 2004) we do however show that local politicians seem to react to an inﬂow
of welfare prone individuals by lowering the welfare beneﬁtl e v e l s .
2the slope of the local government’s reaction function. If γ is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, then strategic interaction occurs between a given local government and
other local governments that have not been assigned a weight of zero.
The econometric problem in estimating the above equation is that the beneﬁt levels
on the right-hand-side are endogenous variables since the beneﬁt levels in all localities
are jointly determined when strategic interactions occurs. Earlier empirical work in
this area have found a positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimate of γ (see, e.g.,
Saavedra (2000) and Figlio, Kolpin and Reid (1999)). The existing empirical work
does however suﬀer from diﬀerent potential drawbacks, all related to the identiﬁcation
of the interaction parameter.4
The aim of this paper is to re-investigate whether local governments react to the
welfare beneﬁt levels in neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own beneﬁt levels.
Our main contribution is that we propose and use a policy intervention to solve the
simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game. More speciﬁcally, we utilize an
exogenous variation that was provided by a policy intervention in Sweden in the late
1980s and early 1990s as an instrument; a centrally geared exogenous placement of a
highly welfare prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities. Using a policy
intervention to identify endogenous and exogenous interactions is an approach that
has never been used before in the literature on welfare competition, and, according
to Moﬃtt (2000) is an approach that is seldomly, if ever, used in general in empirical
work on social interactions.
The IV estimates indicate that there exists a "race-to-the-bottom" and that the
eﬀect is economically as well as statistically signiﬁcant; if the neighboring municipal-
ities decrease their welfare beneﬁt level with 100 SEK, a municipality decreases its
beneﬁt level with approximately 65 SEK. This result seems to be robust to several
alternative model speciﬁcations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
potential problems with the earlier empirical work. Section 3 lays out the theoretical
framework, section 4 presents the policy intervention, section 5 describes the data and
the empirical speciﬁcation, and section 6 provides the regression results. A detailed
sensitivity analysis is given in section 7 and, ﬁnally, section 8 concludes.
2 Earlier empirical work
The empirical literature on the interdependencies between a region’s welfare beneﬁt
level and the beneﬁtl e v e l so fi t sn e i g h b o r si sr a t h e rs m a l l .I nt h ew a k eo ft h em a j o r
welfare reforms that took place in the United States in the 1990s, there has however
4These drawbacks will be discuss in the next section.
3been a growing interest in empirical work on this topic.5 The existing work, that can
be classiﬁed into three types of studies, do however suﬀer from three potential draw-
backs. The ﬁrst type of studies have assumed that there is no exogenous interactions
and/or no correlated shocks at work. The second type of studies have assumed that
there are no endogenous interactions. The third type of studies have put restrictions
on the coeﬃcient that measures strategic interactions.
When estimating models of strategic/social interactions between diﬀerent types of
agents, it is important to consider the distinction between endogenous and exogenous
interactions, as discussed by, e.g., Manski (1993) and Moﬃtt (2000). Endogenous
interactions are transmitted through the outcome variable (that is, in our case, the
welfare beneﬁt levels) while exogenous interactions are transmitted through the other
municiaplities’ characteristics other than their welfare beneﬁt levels (that is, if exoge-
nous interactions are present, a municipality’s welfare beneﬁt level will be aﬀected
by other municipalities’ characteristics other than their welfare beneﬁt levels). As
is discussed and shown by Moﬃtt (2000), without a policy intervention (through
randomized trials or some non-experimental counterpart), it is impossible to identify
endogenous and exogenous interactions separately. According to Moﬃtt (2000), many
studies in the literature on social interactions try to overcome this problem by im-
posing the restriction that only one form of interaction is at work, thereby obtaining
identiﬁcation. However, if the assumed form of interaction is incorrect, the resulting
estimates are either biased or misinterpreted. If, for example, exogenous interactions
are assumed to be zero when they are not, and the model is estimated by two-stage
least squares in which the characteristics of the other regions are used as instruments,
then we get biased estimates of the coeﬃcient on the endogenous social interaction
variable (that is, in our case, of the reaction function coeﬃcient). Similar problems
arise if the endogenous interactions are assumed to be zero when they are not, im-
plying that the model is estimated by regressing a region’s beneﬁt level only on its
own characteristics and the characteristics of the other regions. To be able to identify
the two channels separately, we must hence control for both the other municipalities’
welfare beneﬁt levels and the characteristics of the other municipalities while we at
the same time use a policy intervention to solve the simultaneity problem.
An example of the ﬁrst type of studies is Figlio et al. (1999). They use a panel
of U.S. state-level data over the period 1983-1994 to examine the degree to which
states simultaneously set their welfare beneﬁt levels. In order to do so, they esti-
mate an equation that is very similar to equation (1), but where they also control for
5Apart from the main reform in the U.S. in 1996 (PRWORA), there were several state waivers
e n a c t e di nt h eﬁrst part of the 1990s. As a consequence of the reforms, there was a highly increased
decentralization of responsibilities for the welfare system to the state level, implying an increased
probability for strategic interaction among the states to take place.
4state-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, time dummies, and the states’ characteristics (but not the
characteristics of neighboring states). To break the simultaneity, they use an instru-
mental variables technique. As instruments they use characteristics of the neighboring
states (more speciﬁcally, they use the neighbor states’ female unemployment rate, the
neighbor states’ ratio of females to employed males, and the neighbor states’ average
weekly wages in variety stores). They ﬁnd substantial empirical evidence supporting
the notion that states set welfare beneﬁt levels interdependently; their results indi-
cate that a state is expected to change its beneﬁt levels by 90 cents when neighboring
states change their beneﬁt levels by one dollar. Their IV estimate is more than ﬁve
times as large as their OLS estimate (i.e., when the endogeneity of the neighboring
states welfare beneﬁt level is neglected). In addition, they ﬁnd that state responses
to neighbor beneﬁt decreases tend to be signiﬁcantly larger in magnitude than their
responses to neighbor beneﬁt increases. As noted above, their choice of instruments
are however problematic if there are exogenous interactions, implying that their es-
timates might be biased.6 In other words, in the presence of exogenous interactions
(and/or correlated shocks), the municipalities’ characteristics should be included as
control variables, not as instruments.
Assuming that there are no endogenous interactions, Smith (1991) is an example
of the other types of studies. Using a single cross-section (1979 U.S. data), she only
uses the rival states’ characteristics as explanatory variables (and not their beneﬁt
levels). By estimating such a model, Manski (1993) has shown that the existence
of social interactions is in general identiﬁed. If the coeﬃcients for the other regions’
characteristics are signiﬁcant, then either one, or both, of the two types of interactions
must be signiﬁcant (but we cannot disentangle their separate roles). Smith ﬁnds that
distance matters; it is only close states’ (within 750 miles) that engage in a beneﬁt-
setting game.
Finally, Saavedra (2000) is an example of the third type of studies. Using three
cross-sections of U.S. data (for the years 1985, 1990, and 1995), Saavedra tests empiri-
cally for strategic interactions among the states. The analysis is conducted on separate
cross-sections as well as on pooled data, where in the latter case state-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects are controlled for. Saavedra (2000) does not use an instrumental variables
approach, but estimates a reduced form using spatial econometric methods. As in
Figlio et al. (1999), the results suggest that the states behave strategically when they
set their welfare beneﬁt levels; the estimated slope parameter of the reaction function
is positive and signiﬁcant. A drawback with the econometric approach is though that
one has to impose restrictions on the values that the slope parameter of the reaction
6There estimates would be biased also if there were correlated shocks across regions. The same
type of instruments are also used by Hernes Fiva and Rattso (2003) when testing for strategic
interactions among Norwegian local governments.
5function can take. In Saavedra’s model, the absolute value of the slope parameter of
the reaction function must be less than one.7
3 Theoretical framework
3.1 General setup
To organize our thoughts on the problem, we will use the theoretical setup presented in
Bruckner (2000), building on work by Brown and Oates (1987) and Wildasin (1991).
While we in this section simply present the model, we will in section 4.3 analyze
how the proposed policy intervention aﬀects the welfare game and examine under
what circumstances it can be considered as a suitable instrument for solving the
simultaneity problem.
The model economy contains two regions: A and B. I ne a c hr e g i o nt h e r ea r e
M non-poor consumers, referred to as “rich”, who are immobile across states. The
economy contains 2N poor consumers, who work at low-paying jobs as well as receive
welfare beneﬁts from the region where they reside. The poor are assumed to be mobile
across regions, with zero migration costs. There are NA poor people in region A and
NB =2 N − NA in region B.
The wages of the poor are determined in a competitive labor market, and thus
reﬂect the marginal productivity of unskilled labor. Suppose that the output of region
i depends on the amount Ni of unskilled labor along with other ﬁxed factors (such
as land and capital), f(Ni). The wage of a region is hence equal to wi = f0(Ni) We
assume that f is strictly concave, wich implies that the wage falls as the unskilled
labor pool grows; w0(Ni) ≡ f00(Ni) < 0. Wages in the two regions are then given by
wA = w(NA) and wB = w(NB).L e t t i n gBA and BB denote the welfare beneﬁts paid
to the poor, the total income of a poor resident equals w(NA)+BA in region A and
w(NB)+BB in region B.
Each region’s welfare beneﬁt level is chosen by its rich residents, who care about
the well-being of the local poor (through interdependent preferences). We assume
that the rich in both regions have the same utility function: U(xi,w i +Bi), i = A,B,
where xi gives consumption expenditure for the rich in region i. For simplicity, the
utility function is assumed to be quasi-linear, that is
U(xi,w i + Bi)=xi + V (wi + Bi),i = A,B (2)
where V is increasing and strictly concave in wi + Bi.
7Saavedra uses diﬀerent weighting schemes when estimating the reaction function, also allowing
non-neighboring states to have positive weights. Most of her results do however suggest that state
choices of beneﬁt levels depend on choices in contiguous states, while they in most cases seem to
be independent of the chosen beneﬁt levels in non-contiguous states. Hence, it seems like strategic
interactions mainly take place among states that share border.
6Letting y denote the income of the rich, which is assumed to be the same in both
regions, the budget constraint of a rich resident is given by
xi = y −
NiBi
M
,i = A,B (3)
The beneﬁt level of the region is thus chosen to maximize equation (2) with respect
to the beneﬁt level, such that the budget restriction in equation (3) holds.
We will start by brieﬂy looking at the no mobility case, before turning to the more
interesting case in which the poor are allowed to move between the regions.
3.2 The no-mobility case
In the no-mobility case, solving the maximization problem for the optimal beneﬁt
level of region A yields the following ﬁrst order condition:
MV´( wA + BA)=NA (4)
The condition states that the rich of the region set the beneﬁt levels so that the
sum of their marginal utilities of the poor’s income, is equal to the marginal cost of
increasing the poor’s incomes through increasing beneﬁts. The ﬁrst order condition
is hence a Samuelsson condition for the provision of a public good.
3.3 The mobility case
If we allow the poor to move between the regions, the analysis becomes sligthly more
complicated. Solving the maximization problem in the presence of welfare migration
implies that the rich of region A choose the welfare beneﬁt level taking account of
the fact that an increase in BA raises NA through welfare migration. The regions
thus play a Nash welfare game, with the rich in region A viewing region B’s welfare
beneﬁtl e v e l ,BB,a sﬁxed in making their own choice.
In order to derive an internal migration equilibrium, i.e. in order to avoid a
situation where all poor individuals move to the region with the marginally higher
beneﬁt level, we need to put some constraint on migration. In this model setup, the
assumption that wages depend negatively on the number of poor residents provides
such a constraint.8 Migration equilibrium is achieved when the total income of the
poor is equalized between the two regions, i.e. when the following expression holds:
w(NA)+BA = w(NB)+BB (5)
8This assumption is not crucial to the qualitative results, but could be replaced by other assump-
tions that constrain the migration elasticity of the poor, for example idiosyncratic moving costs or
regional preferences (see for example Smith (1991) or Wheaton (2000)). The wage assumption has
the advantage of being strighforward and easy to analyze.
7By maximizing equation (2) with respect to BA subject to equation (3), and








By comparing equation (6) with the ﬁrst order condition in the no-mobility case,
equation (4), we easily see that the optimal beneﬁt level is lower in the presence of
migration. Two eﬀects contribute to this: First, since increases in the beneﬁtl e v e l
now cause welfare migration, a marginal increase in the beneﬁt level will increase total
costs more than in the no mobility case. We call this the "cost eﬀect". Second, beneﬁt
increases are less productive when the poor are mobile. The reason is the induced
welfare inmigration has a negative eﬀect on the local wage, which partly oﬀsets the
increase in the local poor’s income. We denote this the "wage eﬀect".
Our main interest, however, lies in the interaction between the beneﬁt levels of the
regions, i.e. in the beneﬁt level reaction functions. In order to simplify the derivation
of these, following Bruckner (2000), we assume simple quadratic functional forms for
utility and production. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a tU(xi,w i + Bi)=xi + η(wi +
Bi) − 1
2θ(wi + Bi)2 with η,θ > 0,a n dt h a tf(Ni)=αNi − 1
2βN2
i ,w i t hα,β > 0,
which gives w(Ni) ≡ f0(Ni)=α − βNi.
By applying these functional forms and by combining the ﬁrst order condition in
equation (6) with the migration equilibrium constraint in equation (5), we can solve
for BA as a function of BB:




where Ψ is a constant.
Equation (7) shows the interaction between the beneﬁt levels of neighboring re-
gions. In empirical work, equation (7) is typically estimated through an equation
similar to the one given in equation (1).
By using the quadratic functional forms to solve for BA(NA) in equation (6), we
ﬁnd that the following holds9:




< 0 > 0
,
We see that, in this theoretical framework, we can expect some interaction between
the beneﬁt levels, unless we have the knife-edge case of zero-sloping reaction functions.
The sign of the reaction functions depends on whether the "cost eﬀect" or the "wage
eﬀect" dominates: if the cost eﬀect is larger than the wage eﬀect, we have positively
sloped reaction functions - the race to the bottom case; if they exactly balance, we
9The model setup is symmetric, so the corresponding holds for BB.
8have a zero slope; and if the wage eﬀect is larger, the reaction functions have a negative
slope.10
The model illustrates that the number of poor in a region aﬀects the beneﬁtl e v e l ,
which suggests that an exogenous increase in the number of poor in a region could be
used to instrument for the beneﬁt level. The following section argues that the Swedish
refugee placement program of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s provided exactly this;
an exogenous increase in the number of welfare prone individuals in the municipalities
that can be used as instruments for the municipalities’ welfare beneﬁt levels.
4 Solving the simultaneity problem: Exogenous place-
ment of refugees
In order to solve the simultaneity problem, we would, generally speaking, like to have
a variable that is exogenously distributed among the municipalities and that aﬀects
the setting of welfare beneﬁt levels in a certain municipality but that does not directly
aﬀect the corresponding levels in neighboring municipalities. The theoretical analysis
in the previous section shows that one variable that is likely to aﬀect the setting of
welfare beneﬁts in a municipality is the inﬂow of welfare prone individuals to the
municipality. If we could ﬁnd a social program or policy intervention that generates
an exogenous placement of a welfare prone group among the municipalities, we could
hence use that program as an instrument to solve the simultaneity problem arising
in equation (1). It turns out that such a policy intervention existed in Sweden in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, namely an exogenous placement of refugees. We will use
this policy intervention as an instrument to break the simultaneity problem arising
from the welfare game. The following section describes the main characteristics of
the refugee placement program and discusses the appropriability of using it as an
instrument.
4.1 Description of the refugee placement program
The system of non-voluntary placement of refugees was in place between the beginning
of 1985 and the ﬁrst of July 1994. The assignment of refugees to the municipalities
was coordinated by The Immigration Board through municipalitywise contracts. The
purpose of the program was to achieve a more even distribution of refugees over the
country, or more speciﬁcally, to break the concentration of immigrants to larger towns.
10It is hence the "wage eﬀect", or the assumption that wages depend negatively on the number
of poor in the region, that lies behind the possibility of negatively or zero sloped reaction functions
in this model setup. This scenario is not unrealistic. We can think of other mechanisms that would
yield the same result, for example including housing costs of the poor in the model, and letting these
increase in the number of poor in the region.
9Initially, only a fraction of the municipalities were contracted, but as the number of
refugees soared in the late 1980s and early 1990s, so did the number of receiving
municipalities. In 1991, 277 out of 286 municipalities had agreed to participate.
The original ambition was to direct the ﬂow of immigrants toward municipalities
with good future prospects in terms of labor market conditions and education possi-
bilities. The increasing inﬂow of immigrants combined with the shortage of housing
during the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s meant, however, that these
ambitions had to give way to the more immediate concern of availible housing.
The municipalities received ﬁnancial compensation, paid out by the Immigration
Board, for the refugee placement. Compensation was paid out gradually, during the
year of placement and the 3 following years, to compensate for the running expenses
of the receiving municipality. The larger part of the expenditures consisted of welfare
beneﬁt payments. In 1991, the system was replaced by one where the municipalities
were given a lump sum grant for each refugee. The grant was paid out during the
year of the placement, and was estimated to cover the expenses of the municipality
for about 3,5 years. In addition to the grant, the municipalities had the possibility
to apply for compensation for "extraordinary costs" for the refugee placement, for
example for old or disabled refugees that were in need of special care.11
The refugees were allowed to move immediately after the placement. Under the
system with running expenses, the compensation was tied to the refugee, i.e. was
provided to the new municipality in case of migration. This was not the case under
the lump sum system, where the municipality of placement received the entire sum, no
matter how long the refugee stayed in the municipality. If the refugee did move within
two years after placement, the new municipality also received some compensation.
One previous study uses the refugee placement program as a natural experiment,
Edin, Fredriksson and Åslund (2003). They study the consequences of the program
placement for the labor market participation of the refugees and use data for 1987-91.
The paper provides a detailed description of "the handling of a typical asylum seeker
from the border to the ﬁnal placement".
4.2 Using the refugee placement program as an instrument for
the beneﬁtl e v e l
We will use the policy intervention deﬁned by the refugee placement program between
1986 and 1991 to instrument for the rival municipalities’ welfare beneﬁt levels in 1990-
1994.12 In order to motivate that the refugee placement program is an appropriate
11This system was in place until 1996. From 1996 the compensation is in the form of a lump sum,
but it is paid out gradually during a 2-year period. (The Immigration Board (1997, pp22f))
12According to Edin et. al. (2003) the refugee placement program was more strictly implemented
during this initial period of the program, than during the later years.
10instrument, we need to discuss the exogeneity of the refugee placement program.
In addition, we need to show that it is reasonable to believe that the placement of
refugees in a municipality could aﬀect the beneﬁt level of that municipality, but not
directly the beneﬁt levels of the rival municipalities.
Regarding the exogeneity of the program placement, what is important for our
analysis, is that the refugee placement was exogenous from the point of view of the
municipalities. The period we study is characterized by a number of circumstances
that we argue support this claim.
First, during the time period we will use, the number of refugees arriving to Sweden
increased dramatically. During 1986-91 on average over 16,000 refugees arrived each
year (peaking in 1989 at 24,879), compared to a yearly average of just above 5,000
during the previous six years. This probably made it harder for the municipalities to
refuse to accept the Immigration Board’s refugee placement proposals. The refugees
had to be placed somewhere, and with the increasing inﬂow, all municipalities had to
share the responsibility for this.13
Second, we see that refusals to accept refugee placement were in fact very rare.
Only 5 out of the 281 municipalities in our data refused to receive any refugees at all
during the period we study. We believe it likely that the decision to refuse refugee
placement was connected to municipality-speciﬁc parameters that stay relatively ﬁxed
over time, such as ideology.
Third, the period under study is characterized by a very tight housing market.
This means that if any factor, except for ﬁxed municipality-speciﬁc characteristics,
did inﬂuence the refugee placement, it was probably the availability of housing.14
We argue that the refugee placement can be viewed as exogenous from the point
of view of the municipalities, conditional on housing vacancies and on municipality-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
Another criteria for using the refugee placement program as an instrument for
the beneﬁt levels, is that the program actually aﬀects the beneﬁt levels. A ﬁrst
prerequisite for this to happen is that the program leads to an increase in the number
of welfare prone individuals and that this increase, in turn, implies increased costs for
the municipalities.
When placed in a municipality, the refugee was supported by welfare beneﬁts
during a period of introductory Swedish courses, and after that until he/she had
found other maintenance. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, during an initial
13This notion is supported by the fact that almost all municipalities agreed to receive refugees.
Furthermore, some of the municipalities that did refuse, received a lot of negative publicity for this.
14This claim is supported by various studies that argue that the high unemployment rates among
immigrants from 1980 and onwards are partially due to the fact that housing, instead of factors such
as labor market prospects, has been determining the refugee placement (see for example Edin et al.,
2003).
11period, the larger part of the refugees received social assistance. The municipalities
were compensated for this, during the ﬁrst part of the period we study through the
compensation for runnning expenses during three years, and from 1991 on, through
a lump sum grant that was to cover the expenses for a corresponding period. The
question is whether this compensation was enough, i.e. whether the refugees had
moved out of welfare when the compensation ended or not.
Looking at the data, we ﬁnd it likely that the refugee placement did increase
the pool of welfare dependent inhabitants in a municipality. Refugees, as well as
foreign citizens in general, are overrepresented in the data on welfare recipients. Over
the period 1990-1994, refugee households made up on average 11 percent, and non-
Swedish citizens in general (including refugees) 26 percent, of the welfare-receiving
households, while the fraction of refugees and the fraction of foreign citizens (including
refugees) in the population during the same period roughly equalled 1 and 6 percent
respectively.15
These ﬁgures may however merely represent the fact that the refugees are sup-
ported by welfare during an initial period in the country, for example during the
period of mandatory introductory Swedish courses. For us to be able to use the
refugee placement as an instrument, i.e. for the refugee placement to aﬀect the costs
of the receiving municipalities, we need a signiﬁcant number of the refugees to stay
on welfare also after the termination of the ﬁnancial compensation scheme.
Franzén (2004) analyzes welfare dependency among immigrants, based on inter-
views conducted in 1996 with refugee immigrants that arrived in Sweden between
1980 and 1989. Of the immigrants in the sample, 24 percent are recipients of wel-
fare beneﬁts after 7-16 years in Sweden. In comparison, the share of welfare beneﬁt
recipients in the population in general in 1996 was below 10 percent (8.4 percent,
SCB).
Hansen and Lofstrom (1999) also show that refugees as a group are less likely to
move out of welfare than the native population; still after 20 years in Sweden both
refugee and non-refugee immigrants show higher social assistance participation rates
than statistically similar natives.
Our descriptive data shows that the average size of the annual refugee placement
to a municipality, during the period we study, was equal to ﬁve percent of the pool of
welfare recipients. Provided that many of the refugees stayed on welfare also after the
compensating ﬁnancial grant had run out, as suggested by the studies cited above,
we can conclude that the eﬀect on the welfare costs must have been quite substantial,
15Based on data from Statistics Sweden and the Migration Board. A person is deﬁnied as a refugee
during the year of receiving a residence permit and the three following years. After that he/she is
deﬁned broadly as a foreign citizen or as a Swedish citizen if a Swedish citizenship is obtained (a
refugee can obtain a Swedish citizenship at the earliest after four years).
12at least for the municipalities in the upper part of the distribution.
This suggests that even though the municipalities were to some extent compen-
sated for the refugee placement, we can expect some of the costs to remain after the
compensation period. The fact that the municipalities were provided compensation
for the ﬁrst three to four years of the placement, furthermore suggests that the eﬀect
is probably lagged.16
It hence seems like the refugee placement program lead to an increase in the pool
of welfare dependent inhabitants and to increased costs in the municipalities. The
next important step is that the program aﬀects the reaction function of the receiving
municipality but not the reaction functions of its neighbors. This will next be analyzed
within the theoretical framework laid out in section 3.
4.3 The policy intervention and the theoretical setup
In this section, we will analyze the policy intervention within the theoretical frame-
work presented in section 3. In order to keep the section short and simple, we will
assume positively sloping reaction functions, i.e. the race-to-the-bottom case.17
The refugee placement program can be described as a 3-stage game between re-
gions A and B. We assume that only region B receives refugees, in order to derive
how this aﬀects the beneﬁt levels of the two regions. (That is, we view region B as the
"neighbor" and investigate how a change in its beneﬁt level aﬀects the beneﬁtl e v e l
in region A.) We furthermore assume that the refugees are poor (i.e., that they are
welfare recipients). Unlike the native poor, however, we assume that the refugees do
not work. This implies that the migration constraint of the refugees diﬀers from that
of the native (working) poor. We do not explicitly model any migration constraint
mechanism for the refugees, but start by assuming that the refugees are immobile
between the regions, and then analyse what happens if this assumption is relaxed.
In order to be able to separate between the arriving refugees and the "native
poor", we change the notation of the native poor of region i to ˆ Ni,a n du s e˚ Ni to
denote the refugees of region i.
16It can be noted that several of the Swedish municipalities that found themselves in ﬁnancial
troubles during the 1990s, claim that one of the main explanations to the ﬁnancial situation in their
municipality was due to increased costs in the wake of the refugee placement program. Also, several
of the municipalities claim that they had been undercompensated in the ﬁrst place, indicating that
the inﬂow of refugees might have lead to a real cost for the municipalities earlier than three to four
years after the placement.
17The points to be made in this section do not rest on this assumption, but hold for the model in
general.
134.3.1 Case 1: Refugees immobile between the regions
Stage 0: We start in a stable equilibrium, where the beneﬁt levels of the regions
satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions in the mobility case, and the migration equilibrium
of the native poor, equation (8), is fulﬁlled. The beneﬁt level of region i hence
satisﬁes18:
MV0(wi + Bi)=
ˆ Ni + ∂ ˆ Ni
∂BiBi
1+w0( ˆ Ni)∂ ˆ Ni
∂Bi
and
w( ˆ Ni)+Bi = w(2 ˆ N − ˆ Ni)+Bj (8)
Stage 1: At stage one, the refugees, ˚ NB, are placed in region B.T h e i n c r e a s e
in the number of poor of the region increases the total beneﬁt costs of the rich of
region B.T h ei n ﬂow of refugees hence changes the budget constraint of the rich (see
equation (3)) to also include the cost of the immigrants.







The wage level is, however, unaﬀected by the refugee placement, since the refugees
do not work. This also implies that the migration constraint of the native poor,
equation (8), is unchanged. Assuming that the rich of a region only care about the
native poor, we can rewrite the utility function of the rich in region B as19:






+ V (w( ˆ NB)+BB) (10)
How does the refugee placement aﬀect the beneﬁt levels of the regions? This
depends on our assumption regarding the migration elasticity of the refugees with
respect to the beneﬁt levels of the regions. The assumption that the refugees are im-
mobile between the regions introduces an asymmetry in the model, since the refugees
a r ep l a c e do n l yi nr e g i o nB. The optimal beneﬁt level of region B after the refugee
placement is derived by maximizing equation (10) with respect to the beneﬁtl e v e l
and such that equation (8) holds. The resulting ﬁrst order condition for region B is
given by:
−















By diﬀerentiating equation (11) with respect to BB and ˚ NB,w eo b t a i nt h ee ﬀect of
18We have a symmetric model, so the ﬁrst order conditions for the regions are similar, and wages
and the beneﬁt levels for the two regions are equal in optimum.
19This assumption implies that the refugees only enter as a cost in the utility of the rich. This,
together with the assumption that the poor do not work, ensures a negative eﬀect on the beneﬁt
level in region B of the refugee placement.









We see that the optimal beneﬁt level of region B,g i v e nt h eb e n e ﬁt level of region A,
is lower after the refugee placement. This implies a downward shift in the reaction
curve of region B:s beneﬁt level (see Figure 1).
Stage 2: At stage 2 region A responds to the decrease in BB. Since no refugees
have been placed in region A,t h eﬁrst order condition for the beneﬁt provision of
region A is equal to that of Stage 0. However, the beneﬁt decrease of region B
aﬀects region A, since it makes some working poor from region B move to region A.
Assuming linear reaction functions (as in section 2.3), with a positive slope (the "race
to the bottom" case), the eﬀects of the refugee placement in region B on the beneﬁt
levels of the two regions, can be illustrated by the reaction functions in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Reaction functions, No refugee mobility
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In Figure 1 we see that the beneﬁt levels of both regions are lower after the
refugee placement. The mechanisms are the following: In the ﬁrst stage, the reaction
function of region B, RB, shifts, because the regions’ optimal level of beneﬁti sn o w
lower, given the beneﬁt level of region A. In the second stage, region A reacts to
the beneﬁt decrease of its neighbor, by lowering its beneﬁt level. The eﬀect on BA
is hence channelled through BB and corresponds to a movement along the reaction
function of A, RA,i nt h eﬁgure. As Figure 1 shows, the decrease is larger for the
beneﬁt level of region B.
20We know that Ω1




M < 0 is easily seen from equation (11).
154.3.2 Case 2: Allowing the refugees to move
Figure 1 describes the case of zero migration elasticity of the refugees. What happens
if we relax this assumption?
The assumption of immobile refugees introduced an asymmetry in our otherwise
symmetric model. This asymmetry results in diﬀerent optimal beneﬁtl e v e l so ft h e
regions. In addition, and more importantly for the empirics of this paper, the as-
sumption of immobile refugees assures that all the eﬀect of the refugee placement in
region B on the beneﬁt level in region A, is transmitted through the change in the
beneﬁt level in region B. This is important for the validity of the refugee placement
as an instrument for the beneﬁt level.
If we instead assume that the refugees are mobile with inﬁnite migration elasticity
with respect to the beneﬁt level, we are back in a symmetric model. The intuition
behind this is the following: If the migration of the refugees is perfectly elastic, it
does not matter in which region they are initially placed, but they will "immediately"
move to the region with the higher beneﬁt level. The increase in the total beneﬁt
costs will be shared equally between the regions, and we will hence see equal shifts in
the reaction functions, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Reaction functions, Perfect refugee mobility
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We have now illustrated the interaction between the beneﬁt levels in the cases of
inﬁnite and zero migration elasticity of the refugees with respect to the beneﬁt levels.
However, a more realistic assumption is that the migration elasticity is neither zero
nor inﬁnite, but somewhere in between these extemes. In this case the refugees do not
react perfectly to diﬀering beneﬁt levels between the regions. This implies that even
though some of the increase in the total beneﬁt costs will spill over to region A,t h e
costs will not be shared equally between the regions, but region B will bear the largest
cost. In terms of the reaction functions, we will see shifts in the reaction functions
16of both regions, but that of region B will shift more. This scenario is illustrated in
Figure 3.
Figure 3: Reaction functions, Limited refugee mobility
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The limited migration elasticity of the refugees has introduced some asymmetry in
the model. In Figure 3 we see that this results in an equilibrium that is characterized
by lower beneﬁts in region B than in region A.
4.3.3 Implications for the use of the refugee placement as an instrument
In terms of the appropriateness of using the refugee placement program as an intru-
ment for the beneﬁt level, we ideally wish that the refugees stay in the region in which
they were initially placed, as in Figure 1. In this case the cost eﬀect of the refugees
is conﬁned to region B, and we can be sure that any eﬀect on region A:s beneﬁtl e v e l
is transmitted through BB, i.e. is a result of interactions in the beneﬁtl e v e l s .
If this is not the case, some of the cost eﬀect may however "spill over" directly,
through the migration of the refugees, which implies that some of the eﬀect on BA of
the refugee placement in region B is a direct cost eﬀect, and not a result of interactions
on beneﬁt levels.
5 Data and econometric considerations
5.1 Data
The reaction function derived in the theoretical model is estimated using data on the
281 municipalities’ generosity in providing welfare beneﬁts over the years 1989-94.21
21Seven municipalities (Gnesta, Trosa, Nyköping, Bollebygd, Borås, Lekeberg och Örebro) were
excluded since they had been involved in either secessions or mergers of municipalities in the time
period 1989-1994.
17The reason for starting in 1989 is that we have to use the number of refugees in earlier
p e r i o d sa si n s t r u m e n t s( t h el o n g e s tl a gi st − 4; see below). And since we only have
information on refugee placement from 1986, the ﬁrst year in which we can use the
welfare beneﬁt levels is 1989.
There are several potential candidates for measuring the beneﬁt generosity of a
municipality. One is the norm that regulates the amount of beneﬁts that a person
is eligible for, another is the actual beneﬁt expenditures. We choose to focus on the
beneﬁt expenditures normalized by the number of beneﬁt recipients. There are a
couple of reasons for this. First and foremost, it enables us to use a longer panel
(data on expenditures is available for several years, while data on the beneﬁtn o r m
only is available for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994). In addition, by using beneﬁt
expenditures rather than the beneﬁt norm, we avoid the risk of distortions based
on imperfect implementation of the norm.22 We believe that our deﬁnition of the
welfare beneﬁt level takes us closer to the "true generosity" of the municipalities. In
the following, "beneﬁt expenditures per beneﬁt recipient" will therefore be intended,
when we talk about the "beneﬁtl e v e l " . 23
The drawback of our deﬁnition is that it is a rough measure, in the sense that it
does not pick up variations in the time that a person spends on welfare - i.e. a person
that is on welfare at some point during a year counts as a beneﬁt recipient, regardless
of the number of months he or she receives beneﬁts. An alternative, and in this respect
more precise, measure is to normalize the beneﬁt expenditures by the total number
of beneﬁt months. We have chosen to normalize by the number of beneﬁt recipients,
since this strikes us as a more straightforward and intuitive measure, but will in the
sensitivity analysis check that the results obtained in the baseline estimations are
robust to the alternative normalizing factor.
During the period we study, the municipalities were free to set their own beneﬁt
norms.24 From Table 1 it is clear that this decentralized decision-making in the
setting of welfare generosity led to a large variation in the beneﬁts paid out; the
mean beneﬁts paid out to each beneﬁciary was 8,300 SEK per year with a standard
deviation of 2,200 SEK (and with a minimum of 2,000 and a maximum of 17,000
SEK).25 In fact, it was the great variation between the municipalities, in particular
22There has been a discussion in Sweden that there is an heterogenous implementation of the
beneﬁt norm, both within and between municipalities.
23In the sensitivity analysis, we will however examine whether the results are sensitive to this by
re-estimating the model using the norm instead of expenditures per beneﬁciary.
24There was no mandatory rule for the beneﬁt levels, but general guidelines was provided by The
National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen).
25All monetary variables are deﬂated to 1991 year values. There was also a signiﬁcant variation
in the beneﬁt norms set by the municipalities. During the years 1991, 1992 and 1994 (which are
the years for which we have information about the norms), the beneﬁtn o r ma v e r a g e d1 1 2 ,w i t h
minimum and maximum levels at 80 and 145 and with a standard deviation of 7.8. (The norm is
18the tendency to set the levels below the recommendations of the Board, that ﬁnally
led to the introduction of a mandatory minimum level in 1998 (The National Board
of Health and Welfare (1999)).
Descriptive statistics on the covariates are also given in Table 1. The covariates are
unemployment, tax base, grants from the central government, population 19-29, and
housing vacancies. Beneﬁt level, tax base and grants are measured in 1000 SEK, while
the rest of the covariates are given in percent. These are variables that have been
included in similar studies and/or that we, based on Swedish welfare data, believe
likely to aﬀect the beneﬁt expenditures.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Beneﬁt Level 1398 8.3 2.2 2 17
Unemployment 1405 4.5 2.6 0.2 12.2
Tax Base 1405 659 98 463 1366
Grants 1405 50 104 -1496 1531
Population 19-29 1405 13.9 1.8 10 23
Vacant Rentals 1382 3.9 4.2 0 31
As should be clear by now, we will use the number of refugees received by the
municipalities to instrument for the beneﬁt level. Since we have to consider lagged
eﬀects, we will use refugee data for the years 1986-1994. The overall mean number
of refugees received by the municipalities over the period 1986-1994 was 84. In the
analysis we will use the number of refugees normalized by the population in the
municipality. The annual refugee placement to a municipality during the period
equalled 0.3 percent of the population. Normalizing with the number of welfare
recipients in the municipality, the corresponding number is 5.5 percent.
5.2 Do local governments respond to an exogenous increase in
welfare prone individuals?
A ﬁrst prerequisite for our story to have any bearing, i.e. for the policy intervention
to be a relevant instrument, is that the number of refugees received by a municipality
signiﬁcantly aﬀects the municipality’s generosity in providing welfare beneﬁts. As was
discussed in the previous section, the real costs of a municipality of receiving refugees
arises after three to four years. A ﬁrst prerequisite for our story to have any bearing
is then that the number of refugees received by a municipality in t − 3 and/or t − 4
signiﬁcantly aﬀects the municipality’s generosity in providing welfare beneﬁts. Using
the same policy intervention as in this paper, this issue has been examined in detail
by Dahlberg and Edmark (2004). When running a regression of the type
deﬁned as the percentage of the basic amount and we have used the unadjusted levels for a single
individual.).
19Bit = αi + λt + φRi,t−3 + δRi,t−4 + Xitβ + εit (12)
where Bit is the welfare beneﬁt level in municipality i in time period t, αi is a
municipality-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, λt is a time speciﬁce ﬀect, Ri,t−3 (Ri,t−4)i st h e
number of refugees per capita received in t−3 (t−4), Xit is a vector of time varying
municipality-speciﬁc characteristics supposed to aﬀect the beneﬁt level, and εit is an
error term, they ﬁnd that the number of refugees enters signiﬁcantly and with a neg-
ative sign; the more refugees a municipality received three to four years earlier, the
less generous they are in providing welfare beneﬁts today. This is true both when the
number of refugees in the diﬀerent time periods are used on their own and when they
are used simultaneously (c.f. Dahlberg and Edmark, 2004).
The results in Dahlberg and Edmark (2004) indicate that the number of refugees
received in both t−3 and t−4 might provide relevant instruments, and we will therefore
use them as instruments in the baseline analysis.26 For the policy intervention to
provide a relevant instrument in this paper, we need, however, the average number of
refugees in a municipality’s reference group to be correlated with the average beneﬁt
level in the reference group. This will be examined in the section presenting the
results.
5.3 Econometric considerations
Before turning to the results, we will discuss how the econometric model shall be
speciﬁed, what we must control for and why, and how the reference group shall be
speciﬁed.
The equation we aim at investigating will be of the type given in equation (1),
and hence closely related to the reaction function as derived in equation (7). For
the empirical work to be trustworthy, there are however some additional aspects that
must be considered.
One such aspect is the distinction between endogenous and exogenous interactions.
As discussed in section 2, to be able to identify the two channels separately, we must
control both for the other municipalities’ welfare beneﬁt levels and for the character-
istics of the other municipalities, while we a tt h es a m et i m eu s et h es u g g e s t e dp o l i c y
intervention to solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game.
Another important aspect to be considered is confounding eﬀects such as het-
erogeneity and correlated shocks that might induce a spurious correlation between a
municipality’s beneﬁt level and the beneﬁt levels of its reference group. To control for
26However, in the sensistivity analysis, we will examine how sensitive the baseline results are to
diﬀerent lags on the instruments. Since 1994 is the last year of the panel, all the observations on
refugees are from the period under which the implementation of the refugee placement program was
the strictest (i.e., up until 1991). This is an advantage, considering the exogeneity of the instruments.
20unobserved heterogeneity, we control for both municipality-speciﬁc and time-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects. The municipality-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects will pick up any unobserved and
unchanging characteristics of a municipality that are both related to its beneﬁtl e v e l
and the beneﬁt levels in the municipalities that form its reference group. The time
speciﬁce ﬀects will pick up any unobserved macro eﬀects that aﬀect all local govern-
ments in the same way.
There may also be idiosyncratic shocks that could induce a spurious correlation.
To control for such shocks, we include time-varying municipality-speciﬁc measures as,
for example, the unemployment rate, income variables, and parts of the demographic
structure.
As discussed by Manski (1993), we must control for correlated eﬀects in order to
properly identify the social interaction eﬀect. Since the reference group is ﬁxed, and
s i n c ew ec o n t r o lf o rﬁxed municipality eﬀects, any unobserved time invariant charac-
teristics of the municipality’s reference group will not be part of the identiﬁcation of
the strategic interaction eﬀect. We will also include reference group characteristics,
i.e., group means of the set of covariates described earlier. These reference group
speciﬁc characteristics thus control for correlated shocks within reference groups.27
In our case, as discussed earlier, we must also control for the number of vacant
housing. If the number of vacant h ousing in a municipality aﬀects the amount of
refugees the municipality will receive, and if the number of vacant rentals is correlated
with the welfare beneﬁt level in the municipality, then omitting to control for the
number of vacant rentals might induce a spurious correlation between the number of
refugees and the beneﬁt level.28
Next we turn to the question of how the reference group shall be speciﬁed. That
is, which municipalities play welfare games with each other? It seems reasonable to
assume that the municipalities’ fear of welfare immigration from other municipalities
is stronger the closer these municipalities are. Since the welfare recipients may have
better information about the welfare generosity in nearby municipalities and since
migration costs increases with distance, it also seems more likely that welfare recipi-
ents have a stronger migration response to diﬀerences in nearby municipalities than
to diﬀerences in municipalities further away.29 Furthermore, it seems reasonable to
use a geographical deﬁnition of reference group since this captures the idea that ge-
ographical neighbors belong to the same media market and that they therefore have
27There are hence two reasons why the neighboring municipalities’ characteristics should be in-
cluded as regressors in the model: First, they must be included since we might have exogenous as well
as endogeouns interactions. Omitting any one of them might hence yield biased estimates. Second,
they must be included to control for any correlated shocks within reference groups.
28It can however be noted that the number of vacant rentals is close to a municipality-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀect, implying that this might already be controlled for by the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation.
29These arguments are put forward by Saavedra (2000). As noted earlier, also Figlio et al. (1999)
adopt a state’s neighbors as the relevant reference group.
21good information about the generosity of neighboring states.30
The richest model speciﬁcation to be estimated is then given by
Bit = αi + λt + γB(−i)t + Xitβ + Xitδ + εit (13)
where Bit is the welfare beneﬁt level in municipality i in time period t, αi is a
municipality-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, λt is a time speciﬁce ﬀect, B(−i)t is the average
welfare beneﬁt level among municipality i’s neighbors, Xit is a vector of time varying
municipality-speciﬁc characteristics, Xit is a vector of average time varying charac-
teristics of the geographical neighbors, and εit is an error term. In the empirical part,
we will estimate four diﬀerent speciﬁcations of equation (13). These speciﬁcations
will be discussed in the next section.
5.4 Does refugee migration constitute a real problem?
As noted in section 4, the appropriateness of using the refugee placement program as
an intrument for the neighboring municipalities’ beneﬁt level hinges on the migration
elasticity of the refugees. Ideally, we wish that the refugees stay in the municipality
in which they were initially placed (c.f. Figure 1). Otherwise, some of the cost eﬀect
may "spill over" directly through the migration of the refugees, which implies that
some of the eﬀect on BA of the refugee placement in region B is a direct cost eﬀect,
and not a result of interactions on beneﬁtl e v e l s .
How large is the risk of direct cost spill-overs between municipalities from refugee
migration? This can be evaluted by looking at the migration pattern of refugees
during our sample period. This information is unfortunately not directly available,
but we can obtain an approximation by using sample data on the total immigration
(refugees and non-refugees) to Sweden. The sample consists of approximately 20
percent of the immigrants to Sweden during 1987-89. Following Åslund (2000) and
Edin et al. (2003), we exclude observations of immmigrants originating from OECD-
countries and a number of additional western European countries from the sample,
in an attempt to remove the non-refugee immigrants from the sample. In addition,
immigration of relatives of the refugees has been removed from the sample. We are
left with a sample of 9,283 observations, which is indeed roughly equal to 20 percent
of the total number of refugees during the period.31
In the data we can observe the municipality of residence for the refugees during
the year of arrival, and four years after arrival. The sample hence informs us of the
migration pattern of the refugees between these time periods.
30For example, Besley and Case (1995) also use this deﬁnition of reference group in their empirical
analysis of social interaction eﬀects in the form of tax competition between neighboring U.S. States.
31The number of granted residence permits over the period 1987-89 for refugees were 55046 (The
Immigration Board).
22Looking at some descriptive statistics, we see that 9,080 of the 9,283 refugees were
still living in Sweden four years after the initial placement (i.e., 203 of the refugees
had either migrated from Sweden or died). Out of the 9,080, 60.5 percent were still
living in the municipality in which they were initially placed. This means that 3,589
refugees had changed municipality after four years. Where had they moved?
It turns out that it is the three big towns in Sweden (Stockholm, Malmö, and
Göteborg) and their surrounding areas that are the main magnets. Out of the refugees
that had changed municipality, the majority (68 percent) had moved to or within one
of the counties of these three towns; the Stockholm, Malmö and Västra Götaland
counties (roughly 60 percent of them had moved from counties other than these three,
and approximately 40 percent had moved within or between these counties). We can
conclude that the main migration ﬂows are to these counties.
Since we use neighboring municipalities as each municipality’s reference group,
our instrument is especially sensitive to refugee migration between neigboring munic-
ipalities. In our sample, such migration is rare; only 624 of the refugees have moved
to a neighboring municipality after four years. This is equal to 6.7 percent of the
total sample, or 17 percent of those that have moved. 367 of them had moved to or
within the Stockholm, Malmö and Västra Götaland counties.
Three conclusions can be drawn from these descriptive statistics. First, even after
four years, the majority of the refugees (60.5 percent) is still living in the municipality
in which they were initially placed. Second, only a small fraction of the total number
of refugees that arrived four years earlier, had moved to a neighboring municipality.
This implies that the risk that our results suﬀer from bias stemming from direct "cost
spillovers" between the municipalities is small. Third, out of those that after four
years had migrated within Sweden, the great majority had moved to or within one of
the three big city counties in Sweden: the Stockholm, Malmö and Västra Götaland
counties. This means that if there is any "cost shifting" going on, it is mainly the
three big cities and the surrounding areas that are bearing these costs.
The fact that the migration between neighboring municipalities seems to be small
suggests that the risk of direct cost spill-overs is probably small. Furthermore, the
majority of the refugees remain in the municipality of placement four years after
arrival. We will therefore initially conduct the analysis without taking account of
municipality-wise refugee migration. We will, however, test for the robustness of
the results to secondary migration by presenting estimation results when the three
migration-magnet counties are excluded.
236R e s u l t s
In this section we present our results. First, we present, for comparative reasons,
the OLS results. Second, we present the reduced form estimates (i.e., the ﬁrst stage
estimates in the two-stage procedure and the estimates when we regress our dependent
variable on the instruments). Finally, we present our IV-estimates that are supposed
to measure the causal eﬀect of the welfare generosity of neighboring municipalities
on the welfare generosity of a certain municipality. In all cases, we will consider
four diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In speciﬁcation I, we only control for time dummies and
municipality-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. In speciﬁcation II, we also control for the number of
housing vacancies in the municipalities.32 In speciﬁcation III, we add the observable
characteristics of a municipality. In speciﬁcation IV, ﬁnally, we add all observable
characteristics of a municipality and its neighbors.
6.1 OLS results
For comparative reasons, we initially neglect simultaneity and start by estimating the
model without using any instruments. As can be seen from Table 2, neighbors’ beneﬁt
level enters signiﬁcantly and with a positive sign; if neighbors increase their welfare
beneﬁt level with 100 SEK per beneﬁciary, a municipality increases its beneﬁtl e v e l
with approximately 55 SEK per beneﬁciary. Also, in line with our argumentation,
the number of refugees in t−3 and t−4 signiﬁcantly aﬀects the welfare generosity of
the municipalities; the more refugees per capita that a municipality received three to
four years earlier, the lower is the welfare beneﬁt level today.
6.2 Reduced form estimates
In this section, we present the reduced form estimates. We begin with the ﬁrst stage
regression in the IV approach, i.e. where we run the average welfare beneﬁt level in
neighboring municipalities (the endogenous variable) on the instruments (the average
number of refugees that was placed in the neighboring municipalities, measured as
share of the population, in t − 3 and t − 4). The reduced form estimates of the
endogenous variable on the instruments provide information about the relevance of
the instruments. These results are presented in Table 3. As can be seen from the
results in the ﬁrst two rows, there is a signiﬁcant and negative association between
the number of refugees and the generosity in the setting of welfare beneﬁts; the
32The number of housing vacancies is used as control variables among the neighbors’ characteristics
not to disturb the validity of the instruments (as discussed in section 4). Using the number of housing
vacancies as a control variable in each municipality as well do not change the results at all. As a
matter of fact, the housing vacancies in each municipality always enter insigniﬁcantly when included
in the speciﬁcation. This is probably due to the fact that, as noted in section 4, the variable is close
to a ﬁxed eﬀect.
24Table 2: Estimating the model without instrumenting neighbors’ beneﬁt level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors’ beneﬁt level .333∗∗∗ .632∗∗∗ .567∗∗∗ .546∗∗∗
(.047) (.052) (.048) (.05)
Refugees (t − 3) -1.185∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗
(.328) (.326)




















Vacant rentals (t − 3) -.033 -.029 -.032
(.045) (.046) (.047)
Vacant rentals (t − 4) -.034 -.067 -.077∗
(.05) (.047) (.048)
Fixed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 2225 1383 1369 1369
R2 .717 .811 .823 .824
higher the average placement of refugees was among the neighboring municipalities
in t−3 and t−4, the lower is the average welfare beneﬁt level among the neighboring
municipalities in t. The instruments hence seem to be relevant.
The reduced form OLS regression of the dependent variable (welfare beneﬁtl e v e l
in a municipality) on the instruments (average number of refugees in neighboring
municipalities in t − 3 and t − 4) and the other covariates also provide valuable
information if the instruments are weak since OLS is unbiased in a sample of any
size, regardless of the power of the instruments, whereas the IV estimates can be
noticeably biased. In other words, the existence of a causal relationship between
the dependent variable (welfare beneﬁt level in a municipality) and the endogenous
regressor (average welfare beneﬁt level in neighboring municipalities) can be examined
through the reduced form without fear of ﬁnite sample bias of the IV estimator even
if the instrument is weak.33 Therefore, we next turn to the reduced form estimates
33We do however not have any indications that our instruments are weak. Staiger and Stock (1997)
25Table 3: First stage estimates. Dependent variable: Neighbors’ beneﬁt level. Ex-
cluded instrument: Refugees per capita received by neighboring municipalities in t -
3a n dt-4 .
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Neighbors’ refugees (t − 3) -2.998∗∗∗ -2.959∗∗∗ -2.737∗∗∗ -2.922∗∗∗
(.393) (.386) (.404) (.395)
Neighbors’ refugees (t − 4) -3.115∗∗∗ -3.186∗∗∗ -3.183∗∗∗ -3.218∗∗∗
(.374) (.383) (.38) (.382)
Refugees (t − 3)- . 4 5 ∗∗ -.318∗
(.179) (.175)




















Vacant rentals (t − 3) .002 .013 .015
(.035) (.034) (.034)
Vacant rentals (t − 4) -.131∗∗∗ -.15∗∗∗ -.175∗∗∗
(.03) (.03) (.031)
Fixed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1395 1390 1376 1376
R2 .865 .869 .872 .88
obtained by regressing the dependent variable on the instruments. As is clear from the
ﬁrst row in Table 4, there is a signiﬁcant and negative association between the average
number of placed refugees in the neighboring municipalities three to four years earlier
and the generosity in the setting of welfare beneﬁts in a certain municipality today.
Hence, there are indications of a causal relationship between the welfare beneﬁt levels
in neighboring municipalities and the welfare beneﬁt level in a speciﬁc municipality.
suggest using the F-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of the excluded instruments in the ﬁrst-stage
equation as a diagnostic of the power of the instruments. They argue that if the F-statistic is larger
than 10, there should be no problem associated with weak instruments. Conducting partial F-tests
on the excluded instruments in the ﬁrst-stage regression, we get F-statistics that are in the interval
72-94 for the four speciﬁcations.
26Table 4: Reduced form estimates: Dependent variable (each municipality’s beneﬁt
level) on the instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors’ Refugees (t − 3) -2.913∗∗∗ -2.943∗∗∗ -2.409∗∗∗ -2.545∗∗∗
(.637) (.643) (.56) (.563)
Neighbors’ Refugees (t − 4) -2.267∗∗∗ -2.251∗∗∗ -1.54∗∗∗ -1.6∗∗∗
(.591) (.605) (.566) (.586)
Refugees (t − 3) -1.377∗∗∗ -1.222∗∗∗
(.354) (.347)




















Vacant rentals (t − 3) -.034 -.029 -.035
(.049) (.05) (.051)
Vacant rentals (t − 4) -.118∗∗ -.149∗∗∗ -.17∗∗∗
(.052) (.049) (.05)
Fixed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1398 1391 1377 1369
R2 .785 .788 .801 .806
6.3 IV estimates
The two-stage least squares estimates are p r e s e n t e di nT a b l e5 .A sc a nb es e e nf r o m
the ﬁrst row, there is a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect from the setting of welfare ben-
eﬁt levels in neighboring municipalities on the setting of the welfare beneﬁt level in
a given municipality. The point estimates indicate that if the neighboring municipal-
ities decrease their welfare beneﬁt level with 100 SEK, a municipality decreases its
beneﬁt level with approximately 66 SEK (c.f. speciﬁcation (4)). The estimates for
neighbors’ beneﬁt level hence provide indications of strategic interactions among the
local governments in the setting of welfare beneﬁt levels, implying that there exists a
"race-to-the-bottom".
An interesting thing to note is that the IV-estimates are only slightly higher than
27the OLS estimates (c.f. Table 2), and they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the OLS
estimates. This indicates that the bias resulting from OLS estimation of models of
welfare competition can be seen as rather negligble, at least when using the deﬁnition
of welfare generosity used here.
Turning to the other explanatory variables, it is clear from speciﬁcations (3) and
(4) that the number of refugees received by a municipality in t−3 and t−4 both have
as i g n i ﬁcant and negative eﬀect on the municipality’s welfare beneﬁt level in t,w h i c h
is in line with the main argument of this paper, and that the intergovernmental grants
received from the central level has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on the municipality’s
beneﬁt level. The municipality’s tax base, unemployment rate and population aged
19-29 do however not seem to have any signiﬁcant impacts on the municipality’s
welfare generosity.
Turning to the neighboring municipalities’ characteristics, there seems, at a ﬁrst
glance, to be some exogenous interaction at work since the neighboring municipali-
ties’ unemployment rate enters signiﬁcantly (although marginally so). However, when
conducting a F-test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the neighboring munic-
ipalities’ characteristics (unemployment rate, tax base, grants, and population aged
19-29) are jointly zero. This indicates that there is possibly no exogenous interaction
at work.
28Table 5: IV estimates for baseline speciﬁcation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors’ beneﬁt level .834∗∗∗ .834∗∗∗ .648∗∗∗ .661∗∗∗
(.118) (.118) (.116) (.117)
Refugees (t − 3) -1.108∗∗∗ -1.034∗∗∗
(.344) (.337)




















Vacant rentals (t − 3) -.027 -.028 -.033
(.046) (.047) (.047)
Vacant rentals (t − 4) -.013 -.057 -.059
(.051) (.049) (.05)
Fixed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1388 1383 1369 1369
R2 .805 .808 .823 .823
Hansen J-statistic 0.754 0.985 2.103 2.103
(p-value) (0.385) (0.321) (0.147) (0.147)
7 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we will conduct several sensitivity analyses to check the robustness
of the baseline results obtained in the previous section. In particular, we will exam-
ine how sensitive the results are to (i) migration among refugees, (ii) diﬀerent lag
structures on the instrument (i.e., diﬀerent lag lengths on the refugee variable), (iii)
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the welfare generosity variable, and (iv) the use of neighbors’
characteristics as instruments (as used by, e.g., Figlio et al., 1999).
7.1 Migration among refugees
As suggested by the theoretical model, the policy intervention may not provide a valid
instrument if the secondary migration of refugees (i.e., any migration that takes place
after the initial placement) among municipalities is large. Our choice of instruments
29is motivated by the fact that refugees that arrive to a municipality are statistically
likely to become recipients of welfare, and hence increase the welfare beneﬁt costs of
the municipality. This, of course, hinges on the assumption that the refugees stay in
the municipality that they were initially assigned. It is hence of great importance to
test the robustness of the results to such migration.
The descriptive statistics of section 4.4 showed that the migration ﬂows of the
refugees during the time period we study ﬁrst and foremost were directed towards
the counties of the three largest towns, the Stockholm, Malmö and Västra Götaland
counties. Furthermore, out of the 624 persons in the sample that had migrated to a
neighboring municipality, more than half (367) had moved to municipalities in these
counties. A straighforward sensitivity analysis is to re-estimate the model without
these counties. If the baseline results are biased because of secondary refugee migra-
tion, excluding these observations will provide a model with more valid instruments.34
The results of the IV-estimation, excluding the municipalities of the three "big city
counties" are presented in Table 6.
Table 6 shows that excluding the counties that are the main "migration magnets"
does not substantially change the results. The coeﬃcients of the neighbors’ beneﬁt
level are signiﬁcant in all model speciﬁcations and are very close to those obtained in
the baseine speciﬁcation (c.f. Table 5). As expected, the Hansen J-statistic is smaller
when the three migration magnets are excluded. We conclude that the baseline results
do not seem to be driven by the migration of the refugees.
7.2 Diﬀerent lag structures on the instrument
Next, we will investigate how sensitive the baseline results are to diﬀerent lag struc-
tures on the instrument (i.e., on refugees). In the baseline estimations we used the
average number of refugees in t − 3 and t − 4 as instruments. What happens if we
have other lags or combinations of diﬀerent lags? The results when we use diﬀerent
sets of instruments are presented in Table 7. In Table 7 we only report the coeﬃcient
for the neighboring municipalities beneﬁt level, implying that each cell corresponds
to a separate regression. The covariates us e di ne a c hr e g r e s s i o na r et h es a m ea st h o s e
used earlier for speciﬁcations (1)-(4).
The ﬁrst row in Table 7 simply replicates the baseline estimates (i.e., it shows the
results when we use the number of refugees in t−3 and t−4 as instruments). When
we use the instruments lagged t − 2, t − 3,a n dt − 4,w eg e ts i g n i ﬁcant estimates
in the same order of magnitude as in the baseline estimations (c.f. the second row).
When we also use the instrument lagged only one period, we get signiﬁcant estimates
34It shall be noted that the municipalities are only dropped as dependent variables, i.e. they are
kept when we compute the neighbors’ beneﬁt levels and characteristics. We do this to minimize the
distorsion of the exclusion of the observations of the big city counties.
30Table 6: Sensitivity analysis: IV estimates when the counties of Stockholm, Malmö
and Västra Götaland are excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors’ beneﬁt level .841∗∗∗ .834∗∗∗ .672∗∗∗ .71∗∗∗
(.141) (.147) (.14) (.141)
Refugees (t − 3) -1.136∗∗∗ -1.014∗∗∗
(.384) (.373)




















Vacant rentals (t − 3) .032 .023 .01
(.068) (.067) (.067)
Vacant rentals (t − 4) -.058 -.079 -.064
(.058) (.054) (.055)
Fixed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Obs. 869 864 858 858
R2 .774 .78 .804 .805
Hansen J-statistic 0.562 0.456 1.758 0.923
(p-value) (0.453) (0.499) (0.185) (0.337)
when all instruments are used simultaneously (c.f. the third row) but insigniﬁcant
estimates when the instrument lagged one period is used on its own (c.f. the fourth
row). The latter result is in line with expectations given how the program was set
up. From the last three rows, we note that when the instrument lagged t − 2, t − 3,
and t − 4 are used one at a time, we get signiﬁcant estimates in the same order of
magnitude as in the baseline estimations.
It can also be worth mentioning that when we test the validity of the instruments,
using the Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions, the results suggest that any
combination of the lags t−2, t−3,a n dt−4 produces exogenous intruments. When the
ﬁrst lag is included, the null hypothesis of exogenous variation is, however, rejected.35
35This is consistent with the fact that the implementation of the program, and hence the exogeneity
of refugee placement, was the strictest during the earlier years.
31Table 7: Sensitivity analysis: Diﬀerent lag lengths on the instruments. Only the
coeﬃcient of the neighboring municipalities beneﬁt level is presented.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t − 3,t− 4 .834∗∗∗ .834∗∗∗ .648∗∗∗ .661∗∗∗
(.118) (.118) (.116) (.117)
t − 2,t− 3,t− 4 .857∗∗∗ .869∗∗∗ .722∗∗∗ .723∗∗∗
(.119) (.125) (.115) (.114)
t − 1,t− 2,t− 3,t− 4 .772∗∗∗ .765∗∗∗ .608∗∗∗ .619∗∗∗
(.103) (.111) (.101) (.1)
t − 1 .186 .14 .257 .272
(.165) (.174) (.164) (.167)
t − 2 .827∗∗ .883∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗
(.346) (.335) (.282) (.278)
t − 3 .804∗∗∗ .811∗∗∗ .787∗∗∗ .798∗∗∗
(.166) (.168) (.153) (.152)
t − 4 .78∗∗∗ .784∗∗∗ .565∗∗∗ .565∗∗∗
(.138) (.138) (.141) (.147)
7.3 Diﬀerent deﬁnitions of welfare generosity
Next, we will examine how sensitive the baseline results are to alternative deﬁnitions
of the welfare generosity variable. In particular, we will examine what happens if
we use the beneﬁt norm or welfare expenditures per beneﬁtm o n t hi n s t e a do fw e l f a r e
expenditures per beneﬁciary. Starting by looking at simple correlations between the
three measures of welfare generosity, it is obvious that the beneﬁt norm is only slightly
correlated with the two expenditures measures, while the correlation between the two
expenditures measures are much higher (c.f. Table 8). This indicates that the norm
is not perfectly implemented, as discussed earlier.36 The IV estimates for the three
alternative deﬁnitions of the municipalities’ welfare generosity is presented in Table
9. In Table 9 we only report the coeﬃcient for the neighboring municipalities beneﬁt
level, implying that each cell corresponds to a separate regression. The covariates
used in each regression are the same as those used earlier for speciﬁcations (1)-(4).37
When using the welfare expenditures per beneﬁt month, we note from the last row
that we get very similar results as those in the baseline estimation (c.f. the middle
row). When using the beneﬁt norm, we get point estimates that are much higher than
in the baseline estimations, even though they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each
other. In all cases, the estimated eﬀects are however signiﬁcant, indicating that the
baseline conclusion of strategic interaction among the municipalities in the setting of
welfare beneﬁt levels does not hinge on the way the welfare beneﬁt level was deﬁned.
36This pattern is also observed by Hernes Fiva and Rattso (2003) on Norwegian data.
37Ad i ﬀerence is that we only have information about the beneﬁt norm for the years 1991, 1992
and 1994, implying that we have fewer observations in those estimations (from 768 in speciﬁcations
(3) and (4) to 777 in speciﬁcation (1)).
32Table 8: Correlations between the three measures of welfare generosity
Beneﬁtn o r m E x p . / b e n e ﬁciary Exp./beneﬁtm o n t h
Beneﬁtn o r m 1
Expenditures/beneﬁciary -0.147 1
Expenditures/beneﬁt month -0.090 0.791 1
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis: Alternative deﬁnitions of the welfare beneﬁtl e v e l .O n l y
the coeﬃcient of the neighboring municipalities beneﬁt level is presented.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beneﬁt norm 1.519∗∗ 1.388∗∗ 1.704∗∗ 1.825∗
(.65) (.624) (.815) (.995)
Expenditures per beneﬁciary .834∗∗∗ .834∗∗∗ .648∗∗∗ .661∗∗∗
(.118) (.118) (.116) (.117)
Expenditures per beneﬁt month .858∗∗∗ .829∗∗∗ .485∗∗∗ .561∗∗∗
(.21) (.206) (.16) (.157)
7.4 Neighbors’ characteristics as instruments
As discussed earlier, there are two "theoretical" reasons why the neighboring munic-
ipalities’ characteristics should be included as regressors in the model: First, they
must be included since we might have exogenous as well as endogeouns interactions.
Omitting any one of them might hence yield biased estimates. Second, they must
be included to control for any correlated shocks within reference groups. From the
baseline estimations, there was however only little, if any, evidence of exogenous in-
teractions among the municipalities. Furthermore, if there are no correlated shocks
on the observables, it might be the case that the neighboring municipalities’ charac-
teristics can be used as instruments. This is interesting to examine, since this type of
instruments have been used earlier in the literature (e.g., by Figlio et al., 1999).
The results when we use the neighboring municipalities’ characteristics as instru-
ments are presented in Table 10.38 There are two things to note from these results.
First, the tests for overidentifying restrictions indicate that the instruments are valid.
Second, the point estimates for the neighbors’ beneﬁt level are somewhat higher, even
though they are in the same ballpark, as the baseline estimates. Also, the results are
closer to those obtained by Figlio et al. (1999).
7.5 Some additional sensitivity analyses
In addition to the above discussed sensitivity analyses, we have checked the robustness
of the baseline estimates to: (i) another functional form (using a semi-logarithmic
speciﬁcation), (ii) the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand
38The instruments are the neighbors’ unemployment rate, tax base, grants, and share of the
population in the age interval 19-29.
33Table 10: Sensitivity analysis: Neighbors’ characteristics as instruments
(1) (2) (3)
Neighbors’ beneﬁt level .943∗∗∗ .96∗∗∗ .932∗∗∗
(.182) (.218) (.186)
Refugees (t − 3) -.815∗∗
(.365)








Population 19-29 -.054 .188∗
(.081) (.111)
Fixed eﬀects yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes
Obs. 2225 2225 1374
R2 .682 .681 .808
Hansen J-statistic 4.013 3.551 4.856
(p-value) (0.260) (0.314) (0.183)
side (estimating the model in ﬁrst diﬀerences), (iii) the inclusion of lagged covariates
(but no lag on the dependent varianble). In none of these three cases do we reach
other conclusions than those reached in the baseline analysis. We have also examined
how sensitive the baseline results are to an alternative normalization of the refugees
variable: Normalizing the number of refugees with the number of individuals on
welfare in the municipality instead of normalizing it with the municipality’s entire
population yields almost identical results as in the baseline case.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we re-investigate whether local governments react to the welfare beneﬁt
levels in neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own beneﬁt levels. The main
contribution of the paper is that we suggest and use a speciﬁc policy intervention as
an instrument to solve the simultaneity problem that arises from the welfare game
that the local governments play; a centrally geared placement of a highly welfare
prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities.
We argue in the paper that given that one controls for the number of vacant
apartments in the municipality and for municipality-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, the refugee
placement can be considered as exogenous. Furthermore, we show, in a theoretical
framework following the work of Bruckner (2000), Brown and Oates (1987), and
Wildasin (1991), that, given certain assumptions, it is appropriate to use the refugee
placement program as an instrument since the refugee placement program shifts the
34neighboring local governments’ reaction function while holding the reaction function
of my local government ﬁxed (implying that the eﬀect on my beneﬁt level is only
chanelled trough the beneﬁt level of the neighboring jurisdictions).
In the application we use panel data for Swedish municipalities. In addition to
controlling for observable characteristics of the municipalities, we control for both
municipality-speciﬁc and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. In the baseline analysis, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect from the setting of welfare beneﬁt levels in neighboring
municipalities on the setting of the welfare beneﬁt level in a given municipality. The
point estimates indicate that if the neighboring municipalities decrease their welfare
beneﬁt level with 100 SEK, a municipality decreases its beneﬁt level with approxi-
mately 65 SEK. The estimates for neighbors’ beneﬁt level hence provide indications
of strategic interactions among the local governments in the setting of welfare beneﬁt
levels, implying that there exists a "race-to-the-bottom". These results seem to be
robust to several alternative model speciﬁcations.
In addition, we ﬁnd that the IV estimates are only slightly higher than the OLS
estimates (and they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from them), indicating that the
possible bias from using OLS estimation is negligable. We also ﬁnd that exogenous
interactions seem to be negligible, indicating that neighboring jurisdictions’ charac-
teristics (other than their welfare beneﬁt levels) might be used as instruments when
trying to solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game. However, this
result might be data-speciﬁc and should be tested in each case.
We do not believe that the policy intervention that we suggest and use as an
instrument in this paper is unique for Sweden. Similar programs exist in other coun-
tries (for example in Norway), and we believe that the use of such programs can be a
fruitful way of approaching the problem encountered in models of welfare competition.
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